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Abstract: 
 
On the 28th of March 2015 the Chinese government published "Vision and Actions on Jointly 
Building the New Silk Road, The Economic and 21st - Century Maritime Silk Road"2.  
 
This document signifies China's decision to become a global hegemon. With its issue this 
Chinese African - Eurasian "silk bridge" strategy redirected geopolitical analysts’ attention 
away from another Beijing's strategic objective: control of key maritime straits, especially 
those featuring "maritime chokepoints", where concentrations of commercial and military 
naval routes flow.  
 
Which are the main maritime straits covered by the Chinese "offensive"? What are the 
geostrategic implications of this approach? 
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1. Introduction 
 
China’s bold hegemonically transformational project is officially entitled "Vision 
and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century 
Maritime Silk Road", and publicly known as the Belt and Road Initiative. Drafted 
since March 2015, the document explains Beijing’s aims to take greater control of 
global maritime spaces. In this regard, the project authors have identified two 
strategic axes that start in the South China Sea flowing to the Indian Ocean and to 
the Pacific Ocean respectively, which in combination are designed to create a 
maritime belt around Afro-Eurasia.  
 
For this purpose, as described in the aforementioned strategy, China will implement 
a plan to secure shipping routes that will unite ports located on the route of the two 
axes, for the purpose of strengthening China – Pakistan. and China – Myanmar – 
Bangladesh – India economic corridors. But this information and events in the South 
China Sea have redirected analysts’ attention away from another Chinese global 
strategic objective represented by the silent economic conquest and military securing 
of maritime straits, especially of maritime chokepoints responsible for the overall 
management of naval, commercial and military flows and, in subsidiary, of the 
global shores. Which are the main maritime straits covered by the Chinese 
"offensive"? Which are the geostrategic implications of this approach? 
 
2. Which are the main global maritime straits characterized as 
chokepoints? 
 
A chokepoint is a marine area which causes natural maritime traffic congestion 
through a major strategic waterway. The geo-strategic and geo-economic values of 
chokepoints lie in the: 
• economic consequences generated by their blockage, and forcing the use of 
alternative maritime routes, namely a considerable increase in distances, 
sailing duration, transportation costs and traded goods’ costs, with impact on 
the suppliers and recipients economies (i.e. the price of oil, strategic 
minerals etc); 
• bridgehead characterization involving, in case of taking them over by a 
hostile power, a significant allocation of resources and additional costs to 
remove her control and to resecure them for the use of all nations. 
 
But there are other effects, too. Maritime congestion in subjacent maritime 
chokepoints entails increasing forms of crime at sea, from piracy to terrorism, 
followed by the exponential growth of vessels and cargo insurance policy costs. 
Therefore, controlling and securing the maritime chokepoints represent a strategic  
goal for every major geostrategic player. Globally, there are seven such major 
maritime chokepoints, namely: 
• Danish straits - three in number (Storebælt, Lillebælt, Øresund), belong to 
Denmark, separating the Baltic Sea from the North Sea; 
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• Malacca strait - between the Malay Peninsula and the island of Sumatra, 
separating the southern Indian Ocean from the Pacific Ocean; 
• Strait of Hormuz - between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula (United Arab 
Emirates and Oman’s Musandam enclave), that separates the Indian Ocean 
from the Persian Gulf; 
• Bab el-Mandeb strait - between the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) and the 
Horn of Africa (Djibouti and Eritrea), considered the gateway to the Gulf of 
Aden coming from the Indian Ocean; 
• Suez Canal - between Port Said and Suez Gulf, belongs to Egypt and 
connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf of Aden; 
• Straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles - between the European and Asian 
Turkey, belong to Turkey and connects the Black Sea to the Mediterranean 
Sea; 
• Panama Canal - belongs to Panama and connects the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans. 
 
There are also, other four maritime straits with great geostrategic importance, 
namely: 
• Bering Strait - between Alaska belonging to the US and Cape Dezhnev 
belonging to Russian Federation, separating the North Pacific Ocean from 
the Arctic Ocean. Its geostrategic value has significantly increased due to 
the melting of the Arctic ice cap and the creation, on a medium time 
horizon, of an arctic transport corridor; 
• Gibraltar Strait – between the Iberian Peninsula and Africa (Morocco), 
separates the Mediterranean Sea from the Atlantic Ocean; 
• Strait of Magellan (and Cape Horn) - between Chile and Tierra del Fuego 
(shared between Argentina and Chile), separates the Atlantic Ocean from the 
Pacific Ocean, it is the alternative route to the Panama Canal; 
• Cape of Good Hope - Africa's South point, being the boundary between the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean, representing the alternative route to 
the Suez Canal. 
 
It is important to mention that Cape Horn and the Magellan Strait, as well as the 
Cape of Good Hope maritime routes, are the only channels wide or deep enough for 
heavy tonnage vessels that exceed the dimensions of the Suez and Panama 
waterways. 
 
To understand more clearly the impact of blocking these straits can be illustrated by 
analyzing global maritime oil traffic on daily basis. According to the US Energy 
Information Administration data, in the year 2013, over 50% of global oil was 
transported through maritime chokepoints. Of the 51.15 million barrels of oil 
transported daily, 33.2% representing 17 million barrels were transported through 
the Strait of Hormuz, 29.7%, representing 15.2 million barrels were transported via 
the Strait of Malacca, the rest to 100% being transported around the Cape of Good 
 A.Iu. Catrinel Popescu 
 
95 
Hope – 9.5%, the Bab-el-Mandeb strait – 7.4%, the Danish straits – 6.45%, Suez 
Canal – 6.25%, the straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles – 5.6 % and through the 
Panama Canal – 1.66% (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Key global maritime chokepoints3 
 
 
From the above data, the most congested maritime chokepoint is the Hormuz strait 
due to intense transit of oil tankers transporting crude oil from the Persian Gulf to 
global recipients. The second busiest maritime chokepoint is the Malacca Strait. 
Between 70-80% of the ships transiting that Strait have China as a starting point or 
destination4. Thus is explained China’s critical interest in controlling the South 
China Sea. Oil tanker traffic to Far Eastern customers (China, Japan, South Korea 
etc), the narrowness of the waterway and the laced shoreline topography have turned 
the Malacca Strait into the new “pirate alley”. According to the International 
Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce, in 2014, there were 
                                                          
3Jeremy Bender, these 8 narrow chokepoints are critical to the world's oil trade, Business 
Insider, 01.04.2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/worlds-eight-oil-chokepoints-2015-4, 
accessed at 11.10.2016. 
4Jiang Jie Bianji, China, Malaysia to build third port on Malacca, People's Daily Online, 
05.07.2016, http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0705/c90000-9081726.html, accesat la data de 
20.10.2016. 
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245 pirate attacks worldwide. Among these attacks 141 (57.55%) occurred in South-
East Asia while only 55 (22.44%) occurred in African waters5. 
 
Also, significant oil tanker traffic is registered through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the 
Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal. Flanked by failed states like Somalia, Eritrea and 
Burundi on the one side and Yemen on the other side, Bab-el-Mandeb, with a width 
of only 18 nautical miles - 33.3 km, and the Gulf of Aden were, until recently, the 
riskiest maritime destinations due to the increased incidence of pirate attacks and to 
the proliferation of terrorist networks. The risk of a regional security crisis and the 
impact upon Suez Canal maritime traffic forced the international community to 
intervene to secure the area.  
 
Thus, in the last decade multinational military operations (NATO, EU and AU)6 and 
national (the Russian Federation, China and India) were held in the area in order to 
combat maritime piracy7 and terrorism. Subsequent to military interventions, starting 
with 2014, both maritime robbery and terrorist attacks of Al Shabaab and Al Qa’ida 
in the Arab Peninsula (the two most active Islamist organizations in the region) have 
considerably declined8. Regarding the Suez Canal, instability and the proliferation of 
Islamist movements’ subsequent to Hosni Mubarak’s regime fall in 2011, increased 
transiting vessels’ security risk levels, as well the price of maritime insurance 
policies. The most secure maritime chokepoints are the Danish Straits, the Turkish 
Straits and the Panama Canal. The Danish Straits are the compulsory maritime 
shipping route for Russian oil. The Turkish Straits, whose narrowest point are but 
half a nautical mile (.926 km), facilitate the transit of Caucasian oil to global 
recipients. As for the Panama Canal, it allows North and South American oil to 
transit to Eurasian clients. The recent lifting of the ban on US crude oil and natural 
gas export9 will increase traffic through the Panama Canal (the first conclusive 
                                                          
5ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships –2014 Annual 
Report, REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 January – 31 December 2014, ICC International 
Maritime Bureau, January 2015, http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/2014-Annual-IMB-Piracy-Report-
ABRIDGED.pdf#page=5&zoom=auto,-107,513, accessed at 29.10.2015, p. 7. 
6Active Endeavour – NATO counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean Sea; Ocean 
Shield – NATO counter-maritime piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Indian 
Ocean; Atalanta – EU counter-maritime piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and 
Indian Ocean; Enduring Freedom Horn of Africa – US counter-terrorism and counter-
maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden area; AU lead ongoing counter-terrorism operation in 
Somalia, starting with September 2014.  
7ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships –2014 Annual 
Report, op.cit., p.5 
8Joint security update on Operation Indian Ocean by Somali Government and AMISOM, 
http://amisom-au.org/2014/10/joint-security-update-on-operation-indian-ocean-by-somali-
government-and-amisom/, accessed at 20.10.2016. 
9Brian Wingfield, US Crude Oil Export Ban, Bloomberg, 18.12.2015, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/u-s-crude-oil-export-ban, accessed at 02.10.2016. 
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statistics regarding the volume and destinations of US exported crude oil are 
expected later this year).  Obviously, in these conditions a disruption of flows at any 
of the aforementioned maritime straits is automatically reflected in oil prices and, 
subsequently, the global economy. But, beside oil, other goods from liquefied gas 
and strategic minerals to all sort of commodities are transported through maritime 
chokepoints. For this reason, the control and security of maritime straits are 
imperatives for any major geopolitical player as the price of energy, food, 
technology security are directly connected to the permeability of these waterways. 
 
3. Which maritime chokepoints were the subjects of Chinese interest? 
 
3.1 Indo Pacific area 
Information regarding Chinese plans to construct a string of 18 naval military bases 
along the southern shores of the Afro-Eurasian continental mass was originally 
unveiled in International Herald Leader,10 a newspaper affiliated to the Chinese 
national media agency Xinhua News Agency, on January 4, 2013. A year later, the 
American agency Stratfor published an analysis11 of the Chinese military plan in the 
Indo-Pacific area drawing additional public attention to the inclusion in this plan of 
three other South American states,: Argentina, Chile and Brazil (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Chinese Overseas Strategic Support Bases Plan12 
 
                                                          
10Chinese paper advises PLA Navy to build overseas military bases, 08.01.2013, 
http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/chinese-paper-advises-pla-navy-to-build-overseas-
military-bases.html accessed at 05.03.2016. 
11Mapping China's Maritime Ambition, Stratfor, Stratfor, 23.11.2014, 
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mapping-chinas-maritime-ambition, accessed at 
03.01.2016 
12Mapping China's Maritime Ambition, op.cit. 
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The 18 Overseas Strategic Support Bases, covered by the Chinese military plan are 
located in the following ports: Chongjin (North Korea), Moresby (Papua New 
Guinea), Sihanoukville (Cambodia), Koh Lanta (Thailand), Sittwe (Myanmar), 
Dhaka (Bangladesh), Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), the Maldives, 
Seychelles, Djibouti (Djibouti), Lagos (Nigeria), Mombasa (Kenya), Dar es Salaam 
(Tanzania), Walvis Bay (Namibia ) and Luanda (Angola). 
 
According to Stratfor the Chinese military plan, expected to be functional by the 
year 2023, provides three categories of Overseas Strategic Support Bases for13: 
1. logistical support in peacetime : Djibouti, Aden (Yemen) and Salalah 
(Oman); 
2. logistical support and warships docking, landing strips for aircraft and 
barracks: Seychelles; 
3. military bases for large warships and barracks: Pakistan. 
 
The naval military bases are designed to build three life lines in the: 
✓ Northern Indian Ocean: Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar; 
✓ Western Indian Ocean: Djibouti, Yemen, Oman, Kenya, Tanzania and 
Mozambique; 
✓ Central-Southern area of the Indian Ocean: Seychelles and Madagascar. 
 
A brief review of this military plan’s implementation phase reveals Beijing officials’ 
determination not only to control the southern shore of Afro-Eurasia but additionally 
some of the most important maritime chokepoints, active in this region: 
• North Korea – rental of Chongjin port14, starting with 2012, for a period of 
30 years, for strictly economic purpose; 
• Papua New Guinea – active involvement in the autonomous province of 
Bougainville15 referendum on independence planned for 2020. Bougainville 
is located next to the eponymous maritime strait; 
• Indonesia – bilateral discussions regarding locations for a port on Sumatra 
and another one on Kalimantan16; 
                                                          
13Information already presented in Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative” - The Birth of a New 
Hegemony?, written in colaboration with Tiberiu Tanase and presented at Conferinţa 
Internaţionala „Ştiinţe Politice, Relaţii Internaţionale Şi Studii De Securitate” Ediţia A X-A, 
Sibiu, 27-29 Mai 2016. 
14China gets 30-year lease on DPRK port, China.org.cn, 12.09.2012, 
http://www.china.org.cn/business/2012-09/12/content_26505704.htm, accessed at 
03.01.2016 
15Could China be the catalyst for an independent Bougainville?, The Australian, 26.10.2015,  
http://asopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2015/10/could-china-be-the-catalyst-for-an-
independent-bougainville.html/, accessed at 02.03.2016  
16Zuraidah Ibrahim, Indonesia to throw open doors to Chinese investment; seeks details on 
maritime Silk road, South China Morning Post, 25.03.2015, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1746628/widodo-aims-use-china-visit-boost-ties-
and-seek-details-maritime-silk-road, accessed at 11.10.2016. 
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• Myanmar – free stopovers (no limit of time) for Chinese commercial and 
military ships in the port of Yangon, since 201017; 
• Bangladesh – Chittagong port development works18; 
• Pakistan – starting with April 2015, concession for the next 40 years of the 
Gwadar deep sea port, ideal for docking submarines19; 
• Sri Lanka – Building artificial islands near Colombo, halted in 2015 by 
President’s Maithripala Sirisena administration, following India’s protests20 
• Seychelles and Maldives Archipelagos – construction of Chinese naval 
military bases in the deep sea natural harbors to combat maritime piracy21; 
• Gulf of Aden – free stopovers (no limit of time) for military and commercial 
ships in Chinese ports in Yemen and Oman since 201022;  
• Tanzania – a China – Oman project of Bagamoyo port modernization and 
development into the largest maritime trade hub in East Africa23; 
• Kenya – Lamu port and Mombasa port modernization. Lamu port hosts the 
headquarters of the LAPSSET pipeline maritime terminal that will serve 
Ethiopia, Uganda, South Sudan and Kenya24. Mombasa port is the largest 
port in the Horn of Africa; 
• Mozambique – reconstruction of Beira fishing port and investments in 
infrastructure projects. Beira port is located inside the Mozambique 
Channel25;  
• South Africa – under the current administration of South African President 
Jacob Zuma accelerated development of political, economic and military 
                                                          
17Mapping China's Maritime Ambition, op.cit. 
18Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS, http://amti.csis.org/indian-ocean/, accessed at 
22.10.2015 
19Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, op.cit. 
20Ibidem. 
21Chinese President Xi highlights that common understanding and joint efforts have brought 
Sino-Maldives relations to the cusp of elevation to a higher plane. President Yameen thanks 
President Xi for positively considering his proposal to support the construction of the Male’-
Hulhule’ Bridge, The President’s Office, 15.09.2014, http://www. 
presidencymaldives.gov.mv/Index.aspx?lid=11&dcid=14821, accessed at 20.02.2016 
22Mapping China's Maritime Ambition, op.cit. 
23Arthur Chatora, Tanzania breaks ground on $10bn China-Oman funded port, din sursa 
Reuters, 30.10.2015, http://thisisafrica.me/tanzania-breaks-ground-on-10bn-china-oman-
funded-port-project/, accessed at 20.02.2016. 
24George Mwangi, Chinese Firm Signs $478.9 Million Kenya Lamu Port Deal, THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL, 03.08.2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/frontiers/2014/08/03/chinese-firm-
signs-478-9-million-kenya-lamu-port-deal//, accessed at 20.02.2016. 
25China funds reconstruction of fishing port in Mozambique, macauhub, 11. 09.2014, 
http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/2014/09/11/china-funds-reconstruction-of-fishing-port-in-
mozambique/, accessed at 02.03.2016.  
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cooperation26 inside the institutional framework of the emerging powers 
organization BRICS27 as well as in the particular, bilateral relationship; 
• Namibia – discussions regarding the location of a military naval base in the 
deep sea port of Walvis Bay28; 
• Angola – increasing presence of Chinese warships in the port of Luanda 
since 201329 and major investments in the national economy; 
• Nigeria – increasing presence of Chinese warships in the port of Lagos since 
2013 and joint naval military exercises, in the Nigerian territorial waters in 
2013 and 201430, cooperation in the military field, as well as major 
investments in transport infrastructure and exploitation of hydrocarbon 
resources and mineral ores. 
 
By superimposing maps shown in Fig.1 and Fig.2 we note the strategic location of 
these ports near some of the most important maritime chokepoints such as:  
• Malacca Strait – Chongjin port in North Korea, Bougainville port in Papua 
New Guinea, Yangon port in Myanmar, future Sumatra and Kalimantan 
ports; 
• Strait of Hormuz – Gwadar port in Pakistan; 
• Bab el-Mandeb strait – Djibouti port, Kenyan Lamu and Mombasa ports, 
Tanzanian port of Bagamoyo; 
• Gulf of Aden – Yemen and Oman ports; 
• Cape of Good Hope – the Namibian port of Walvis Bay and Chinese – 
South African cooperation on multiple levels. 
 
These data should be read in conjunction with the territorial dispute in the South 
China Sea between China and the rest of the riparian states (Taiwan, Brunei, 
Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines). The dispute concerns sovereignty over the 
Spratly, Paracel and Natuna Islands, the territorial waters, exclusive economic zones 
and their related maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
                                                          
26China is one of the main military partners of Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See: China’s role in 
Africa’s conflicts: Military cooperation, arms transfers and involvement in peacekeeping 
operations, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, 
14.04.2014,http://www.polity.org.za/article/chinas-role-in-africas-conflicts-military-
cooperation-arms-transfers-and-involvement-in-peacekeeping-operations-2014-04-14, 
accessed at 02.03.2016 
27BRICS is the acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
28Adam Hartman, Chinese naval base for Walvis Bay, The Namibian, 19.11.2014, 
http://www.namibian.com.na/ index.php?id=130693&page=archive-read, accessed at 
20.10.2015. 
29Mapping China's Maritime Ambition, op.cit. 
30Chinese, Nigerian Navies Conduct First-Ever Joint Military Exercise; Anti-Piracy 
Drills Underway, Beegeagle’s blog, 29.05.2014, 
https://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2014/05/29/chinese-nigerian-navies-conduct-first-ever-
joint-military-exercise-anti-piracy-drills-underway/, accessed at 02.03.2016. 
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Beijing’s decision to build three artificial islands equipped with runways, ports and 
military bases in the Spartly Archipelago, followed by naval, terestrial and air 
interdiction of other riparian states from performing economic and military activities 
in the region, are based on a double stake: 
 
1. economic – related to the right of ocean fishing, the right of hydrocarbon 
exploitation (11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic meters of natural gas), 
sub-marine strategic minerals exploitation, and control of the trade routes passing 
through the region31; 
2. strategic – control of maritime corridors that connect Southern and Northern 
Pacific Ocean, passing through Malacca chokepoint region. 
 
Given the total volume of goods transiting the South China Sea worth $ 5.3 trillion 
annually32 even a temporary lock of the maritime corridors would result in major 
economic consequences worldwide. No – fly zones in the South China Sea are 
already affecting smooth running of military and civilian transit in the region, and 
China’s sovereignty claims over Northern Pacific islands, disputed with Japan – the 
islands of Senkaku/Diaoyu as well as with Japan and South Korea – Socotra islands, 
generated re-balancing formulas through geopolitical axis such as US – Vietnam – 
India, US –Taiwan – Japan –South Korea, US – Australia – New Zealand33. 
 
The ports covered by the Chinese military plan target not only the major maritime 
chokepoints but also other straits that might otherwise become alternative routes 
should the main ones be blocked. In this respect, the main regions covered by the 
Chinese strategy are the Indonesian Archipelago and Malaysia, Philippine 
Archipelago, the island of Papua New Guinea, Australia, Andaman Archipelago, 
Malvinas Archipelago, Mozambique Channel, Zanzibar and Pemba straits. 
 
1. Indonesia – contains a large number of side straits that can take over, if 
necessary, maritime traffic that might be diverted from the Strait of Malacca (see 
map in Figure 3)34. Among these ones there are Bangka Strait - between the islands 
                                                          
31Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/territorial-disputes-in-
the-south-china-sea, accessed at 02.03.2016  
32Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, op.cit. 
33Ibidem. 
34Namely: the Strait of Alor - between archipelago Solor and Archipelago Alor, Bali Strait - 
between the islands of Bali and Java, Gaspar Strait - between the islands of Belitung and 
Bangka, Lombok Strait - between the islands of Bali and Lombok (Java Sea), Madura Strait - 
between the islands of Java and Madura, Manipal Strait - between the islands of Ceram and 
Buru, Mindoro Strait - between the islands of Mindoro and Palawan, Ombai Strait - between 
Alor Archipelago and the island of Wetar, Sumba Strait - between the islands of Flores and 
Sumba, Sunda Strait - between the islands Sumatra and Java, Indonesia Dampier Strait - 
between Bird's Head peninsula and Raja Ampat islands, Wetar Strait - between Timor and 
Wetar island. 
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of Sumatra and Bangka, Mentawai Strait - between the islands of Sumatra and 
Mentawai, Karim Strait - between the islands of Sumatra and Borneo (Kalimantan is 
the Indonesian part of the Borneo island), Singapore Strait - between Singapore and 
Sumatra and the Strait of Macassar - between the islands of Borneo and Sulawesi. 
 
Figure 3. Political map of the Indonesian Archipelago and Malaysia35 
 
 
This is how Chinese naval base location in the islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan, 
for example, exert direct influence not only upon the Straits of Malacca but also on 
the rest of the region, as can be seen in Fig.2.  Chinese military plans in Indonesian 
waters are supported by a strong community of Chinese nationals and companies 
operating in the region reunited in the so-called bamboo network36. According to the 
2010 census, there are more than 2.8 million Chinese living in the Indonesian 
Archipelago, representing 1.2% of the total population of the country37. But 
unofficial sources claim that the number of ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia would 
reach between 10 and 12 million people, including some who are 3rd and 4th 
generation, but who declared themselves Indonesians.  
 
The Bamboo network is a sort of Chinese Commonwealth built on business 
relationships between Chinese individuals and companies based in China and 
                                                          
35Political Map of the Republic of Indonesia, One World – Nations Online, 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/indonesia_map2.htm, accessed at 02.10.2016 
36Murray L. Weidenbaum, Samuel Hughes, The Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Chinese 
Entrepreneurs are Creating a New Economic Superpower in Asia, Simon and Schuster, 1996 
37Indonesia, CIA - The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_id.pdf, accessed at 02.03.2016.  
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residents and Chinese companies operating in South-East Asia, in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan. Gradually, the 
network has extended to other global areas of Chinese interest, such as sub-Saharan 
Africa, for example. This business network of high political influence is a soft 
power, a subversive vector, which is meant to ensure and to secure Chinese presence 
in the targeted areas. 
2. Malaysia – and Indonesia share the control of Malacca Strait. In July 
2016, China and Malaysia started negotiations for the construction of the third 
commercial port located in Carey Island, between Port Klang and the Malacca 
Strait38. China is, already building a container terminal in Port Klang next to the 
Malacca Straits, the 12th largest commercial port globally, and is interested in the 
free zone around it, too. China is also participating in the Malaysia-China Kuantan 
Industrial Park development project in Gebeng City which will transform Kuantan 
port, currently the petrochemical hub of Malaysia, into a logistical hub39. Moreover, 
Kuala Lumpur officials stated Malaysia’s desire to participate in the "silk belt" 
project with six ports, and to develop bilateral economic relations in many fields. 
3. Philippines and Papua New Guinea - a region with numerous maritime 
straits40. The naval, terestrial, and air interdiction imposed by China in the South 
China Sea led the Manila government to file a complaint against Beijing at the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague41. Philippines won the trial under a 
resolution dated July 12, 2016. Although a signatory to the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, Beijing does not recognize the jurisdiction of The Hague Court and, 
consequently, does not recognize and does not apply any of its resolutions. 
Consequently, the dispute has been moved into the law fare category of operations, 
with no foreseeable, in terms of time, clarification. But in recent months, we notice 
Philippines president’, Rodrigo Duterte, political shift toward China (Duterte won 
the presidential elections in May 2016). This approach culminated with Duterte 
statement regarding the end, after 65 years, of the US-Philippines strategic 
                                                          
38Jiang Jie Bianji, idem. op.cit. 
39Welcome To Kuantan Port Consortium, 
http://www.ijm.com/infrastructure/port/kuantanport/, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
40Such as: the Strait of Bougainville - between the island of Bougainville in Papua New 
Guinea and the Choiseul island of Solomon Islands (British), Cebu Strait - between the 
Philippines Bohol and Cebu islands, Vitiaz Strait - between the Papua New Guinea and Long 
Island, Dampier Papua New Guinea Strait - between the Papua islands of New Britain and 
Umboi, Strait of Johore - between the Malay Peninsula in the area controlled by Malaysia 
and Singapore, the Strait of Balabac - between the islands of Palawan in the Philippines and 
Borneo in Indonesia, Pollilo Strait - between the islands Luzon and Pollilo in the Philippine, 
Surigao Strait - between the islands Leyte and Mindanao in the Philippines, Tablas Strait - 
between the islands of Mindoro and Panay in the Philippines, Strait of Tanon - between the 
islands of Negros and Cebu in the Philippines, Strait of San Bernardino - between the islands 
Luzon and Samar in the Philippine, Strait San Juanico - between the islands of Samar and 
Leyte in Philippines and, especially, Luzon Strait - between Taiwan and Philippine island of 
Luzon. 
41Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, idem. op.cit. 
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partnership and his administration political orientation towards China, statement that 
was „qualified” a few days later42. Obviously, in the context of Manila’s political 
shift towards China there is a high probability for Beijing to get consent for a 
military base in the Philippine straits which would strengthen Chinese military 
influence of the flows in the Indo-Pacific area. 
4. Australia - concession for 100 years starting in 2015, the Port of Darwin is 
located in the Northern part of the continent, near the Clarence Strait (between 
Melville Island and the mainland). The concession was won by a Chinese company, 
Landbridge, whose shareholders are connected to Beijing’s military structures43. In 
September 2016, a consortium including the China Investment Corporation bought 
the share package of Australia's largest port of Melbourne44. The Port of Melbourne 
is located next to The Rip (aka The Heads Strait) connecting Port Phillip Bay (where 
the city of Melbourne is located) to the Bass Strait between the Australian mainland 
and the island of Tasmania. 
5. The Chinese effort toward control of key strategic straits could also be 
interpreted to include Sri Lanka’s, Malvinas’ and Bangladesh’ ports in the Chinese 
military plan. In the Indian Andaman Archipelago there are Homfray, Diligent and 
Duncan Straits and between India and Sri Lanka, the Palk Strait. 
6. Also, some of the Sub Saharan ports targeted by the Chinese military plan 
are located at the mouth of some important straits such as the Mozambique Channel 
- between Mozambique and Madagascar, Pemba Strait - between the Tanzanian 
island of Pemba and the African continent, and the Zanzibar Strait - between the 
Tanzanian island of Zanzibar and Africa and the Cape of Good Hope. 
 
3.2 Persian Gulf and Suez Canal 
In late January 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited, as part of a diplomatic 
tour, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt, the main Middle East countries targeted by the 
Belt and Road Initiative45. Among these countries, Iran and Egypt control two of the 
major chokepoints, namely Hormuz Strait and the Suez Canal. 
1. Persian Gulf 
• Saudi Arabia – the bilateral discussions have addressed three major themes: 
the cooperation in the energy sector and the opening of Yasref refinery (built 
                                                          
42Neil Jerome Morales, Philippines' Duterte says didn't really mean 'separation' from U.S., 
Reuters, 22.10.2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-
idUSKCN12L28T?utm_content=bufferbd493&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.
com&utm_campaign=buffer, accessed at 20.10.2016. 
43Callum Wood, China Buys Panama’s Largest Port, the Trumpet, 22.06.2016, 
https://www.thetrumpet.com/article/13973.18.0.0/world/military/china-buys-panamas-
largest-port, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
44Cecile Lefort, Byron Kaye, Australian port sold for $7.3 billion to consortium; China fund 
among backers, 
Reuters, 19.09.2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-privatisation-ports-
idUSKCN11P04O, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
45President Xi Jinping visits Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Jan. 19-23, 2016, Xinhua, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/cnleaders/201601xjp/, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
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by Chinese state company Sinopec and the Saudi company Aramco), the 
issue of Uyghur Islamism in Western China and the cooperation within the 
Belt and Road Initiative. According to Council on Foreign Relations, 32.2 
million barrels of oil representing over 50% of daily global sea-borne 
traffic46 pass through the Indian Ocean. Most of these oil tankers are coming 
from the Persian Gulf, where Saudi Arabia is the de facto leader of the Sunni 
monarchies. 
2. Strait of Hormuz 
• Iran - is one of China's traditional partners in the region. During president 
Jinping’s visit in Tehran he signed 17 memoranda on Iran's participation in 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative47. But China's hegemonic ambitions must 
take into account Russian geopolitical interest in the region to which Iran is 
a critical pivot of the Russian inner security ring. Also Chinese strategists 
must consider Iran's Central Asia aims that are increasingly centered on the 
idea of restoring the ancient Persian Empire. These overlapping interests 
explain China’s failure to take over the strategic Chabahar Port in the Straits 
of Hormuz that was instead leased to the Indians48. 
3. Suez Canal 
• Egypt - about 8% of the global cargo traffic pass via the Suez Canal. This 
canal shortens distances by 19% on the Singapore - New York route 
compared to the Panama Canal route, and by 42% on the Rotterdam - 
Persian Gulf route versus the Cape of Good Hope route49. During the 
Chinese president’s visit in Cairo a number of bilateral agreements aimed at 
strengthening Egypt’s participation in Belt and Road Initiative were 
concluded. Some of the agreements are related to bilateral cooperation in the 
development and expansion of the Suez Canal, construction of Egypt’s new 
administrative capital50, and development of the China-Egypt Suez 
Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, all based on a strategic partnership. 
Also, we should mention that Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula affords a strategic 
position on the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba. Near the entrance to the 
Gulf coming at the Red Sea Cairo owns both the Tiran and Sanafir strategic 
islands which were the subject of a commercial transaction with Saudi 
                                                          
46Eleanor Albert, Competition in the Indian Ocean, CFR Backgrounders, 30.10.2015, 
http://www.cfr.org/regional-security/competition-indian-ocean/p37201?cid=soc-facebook-
in-competition_indian_ocean-bgr-103115, accessed at 29.10.2015. 
47Chinese president concludes three-nation Middle East tour, CCTV America, 24.01.2016, 
http://www.cctv-america.com/2016/01/24/chinese-president-concludes-three-nation-middle-
east-tour, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
48Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, idem. op.cit. 
49Ahmed Feteha, Egypt Shows Off $8 Billion Suez Canal Expansion That the World May Not 
Need, Bloomberg, 04.08.2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-04/egypt-
shows-off-8-billion-suez-canal-gift-world-may-not-need, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
50China, Egypt agree to boost cooperation under Belt and Road Initiative, Xinhuanet, 
22.01.2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/22/c_135033384_2.htm, accessed at 
10.10.2016. 
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Arabia early in 2016. But the Saudi-Egyptian agreement was contested in an 
Egyptian court and the transaction failed51. However, due to her ongoing 
economic crisis a future international offer to sell these islands might be 
launched by Egypt where China might be among other potential buyers. 
 
3.3 Mediterranean Basin 
The main Mediterranean countries targeted by the Chinese strategy are either located 
around Gibraltar Straits as Morocco, Spain and, adjacent Algeria; those around the 
Otranto Straits including Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro, or the Levantine basin 
states - seen as a component of a strategic axis with the nearby Turkish Straits and 
the Suez Canal – thus, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus.  
1. Straits of Gibraltar:  
• Morocco - In May 2016, King Mohammed VI paid a state visit to China. On 
this occasion, 15 bilateral conventions were signed. Some of the conventions 
targeted port Tanger - Med and the adjacent free trade zone that lies in the 
immediate vicinity of the Gibraltar Straits52.  
• Spain - a Chinese company, COSCO Ports, the world’s second largest port 
terminal operator, could be one of the participants in the international tender 
for the construction of the third cargo terminal in the port of Algeciras. The 
Port of Algeciras is located on the Northern Mediterranean shore opposite to 
the port of Tangier53 also in the immediate vicinity of the Gibraltar Straits. 
According to auction organizers, after the deadline for tender submission on 
November 30, 2016, the identity of the bidders will become public.    
• Algeria – the signing in January 2016, of a bilateral agreement on 
construction and operation by Chinese companies of the new commercial 
Port of Cherchell located 60 km west from the capital, Algiers54.  
2. Levantine Basin:  
• Israel - in March, 2015, the Chinese company Shanghai International Port 
Group won the international tender for the development and management 
for 25 years of the new Port of Haifa in Northern Israel55.  
                                                          
51Ruth Michaelson, Egyptian court quashes deal to transfer Red Sea islands to Saudi Arabia, 
The Guardian, 21.06.2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/21/egyptian-court-
quashes-transfer-red-sea-islands-saudi-arabia, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
52Nadia Lamlili, Maroc-Chine: une quinzaine de contrats signés durant la visite de 
Mohammed VI, Jeunne Afrique, 17.05.2016, 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/325644/politique/pluie-de-contrats-entre-maroc-chine/, 
accessed at 10.10.2016. 
53Angela Yu, COSCOCS unit to bid for container terminal at Algeciras port, Fairplay, 
25.08.2016, http://fairplay.ihs.com/ports/article/4274001/coscocs-unit-to-bid-for-container-
terminal-at-algeciras-port, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
54China, Algeria to build mega sea port, Xinhua, 18.01.2016, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/18/c_135018002.htm, accessed at 10.10.2016 
55Kenneth Rapoza, Albania Becomes Latest China Magnet, Forbes, 13.06.2016, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/06/13/albania-becomes-latest-china-
magnet/#2fe4850e11b0, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
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• Greece - in April 2016, Chinese company COSCO Piraeus bought a 67% 
interest in the Port of Piraeus located on the Saronic Gulf just a few 
kilometers south of Athens.  Pireaus is Greece's largest port and world’s 
third largest in numbers of passengers.  
• Cyprus - in January 2016, Chinese COSCO tried, but failed to win control of 
the management of Limassol port through an international tender56.  
3. Otranto Strait - between Apulia (Italy) and Albania these straits separate the 
Adriatic Sea from the Ionian Sea.  
• Albania –Chinese companies have expressed interest in investing in the 
ports of Durres and Shengjin57.     
• Croatia – Chinese companies have expressed interest in investing in the port 
of Rijeka58.  
• Montenegro – Chinese companies have expressed interest in the port of 
Bar59.  
 
3.4 Turkish Straits and the Black Sea 
The main countries targeted by the Chinese strategy are Turkey and the Black Sea 
countries Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia.  
• Turkey - during September 2015, COSCO Pacific and China Merchants 
Holdings International bought a 65% interest in the Kumport terminal in the 
Ambarli port complex, the largest on Turkish territory. Ambarli port is 
located in the northwestern portion of the Sea of Marmara on the European 
side of Istanbul near the strategic Bosphorus Straits that separate the Black 
Sea from the Sea of Marmara. The Bosphorus is the narrowest strait in the 
world used for international navigation. Kumport terminal, the third largest 
in Turkey, manages 13% of the country's container traffic60. In addition, 
Turkey is one of the key states in the Mediterranean corridor of China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative.   
• Romania - Chinese companies expressed interest in investing in the Port of 
Constanta.  
                                                          
56Maria Petrakis, COSCO charts course for entry into Cyprus, China Daily, 29.01.2016, 
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-01/29/content_23301596.htm, accessed at 
10.10.2016 
57Kenneth Rapoza, idem. op.cit. 
58Vedran Pavlic, Chinese Investors the Only Remaining Hope for Port of Rijeka, total croatia 
news, 29.02.2016, http://www.total-croatia-news.com/business/2658-chinese-investors-the-
only-remaining-hope-for-port-of-rijeka, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
59Chinese top officials voice interest in developing Montenegro's Port of Bar, PM Đukanović 
notes following China-CEE summit in Suzhou, Prime Minister of Montenegro, 26.11.2015, 
http://www.predsjednik.gov.me/en/news/154809/PM-dukanovic-meets-with-China-s-top-
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10.10.2016. 
60Vincent Wee, Cosco Pacific in jv to buy into Turkey's Kumport Terminal, Seatrade 
Maritime News, 17.09.2015, http://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/asia/cosco-pacific-in-
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• Bulgaria - Chinese companies expressed interest in investing in the Ports of 
Varna and Burgas61.  
• Georgia - US-Georgian consortium won the tender on the construction of the 
Anaklia deep sea port located 25 km from the port of Poti, although, 
initially, a Chinese company was preferred. Anaklia port is scheduled to be 
part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and Georgia is one of the 
founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, one of the 
financial instruments provided in support of the Chinese strategy in Afro-
Eurasia62.   
It is important to note that China's failure in the Black Sea region must be linked to 
geopolitical interests in the area where Russia and EU/NATO play out their 
competing spheres of influence.   
 
3.5 Nordic Routes 
Following the accelerated thawing of the Arctic ice cap northern sea routes will take 
away much of the traffic through the Suez Canal and Malacca Straits. In these 
circumstances, the Bering Strait, located between Alaska and Siberia, separating the 
Pacific Ocean from the Arctic Ocean, will become a future chokepoint of utmost 
importance as future Barentz, Iceland, Greenland ports, as well as ones located along 
the Arctic coastline, become operational.  
 
But a major power in the region is the Russian Federation with which Beijing 
leaders are cooperating politically and economically within the BRICS and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The relationship between the two emerging 
powers is marked by geopolitical competition in Central Asia, the Caucasuses, the 
Levant, the African states previously affiliated to the Soviet Union’s sphere of 
influence and potentially, in the Arctic areas, belonging to Russian Federation’s 
internal security ring covered by the “silk bridge”.   
 
In this context, the “cold peace” in bilateral relations is likely to turn into 
confrontation if there is no mutual understanding regarding divisions of spheres of 
influence between the two powers (ie: the northern hemisphere for the Russian 
Federation and the Southern hemisphere to China) or if this understanding is 
violated. In this respect a nuance introduced by Sergei Alexandrovich Karaganov63, 
                                                          
61Ion TIŢA-CĂLIN, Portul Constanţa e mai puţin atractiv pentru China decât porturile 
bulgăreşti şi turceşti, Cuget Liber, 27.02.2016, http://www.cugetliber.ro/stiri-economie-
portul-constanta-e-mai-putin-atractiv-pentru-china-decat-porturile-bulgaresti-si-turcesti-
282102, accessed at 10.10.2016 
62Wade Shepard, Anaklia 'Silk Road' Port Set To Transform Georgia And Enhance China-
Europe Trade, Forbes, 29.09.2016, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/09/29/silk-road-anaklia-deep-sea-port-set-
to-transform-georgia/#6cb70f903f47, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
63Sergei Karaganov is the Dean of the School of International Economics and Foreign Policy 
in Moscow and the current foreign policy adviser to President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. 
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the author of Eurasian Union from Lisbon to Vladivostok project64 which supports 
Russia pivoting to the East by integrating Eurasian Economic Union with the Silk 
Belt and Road, China is seen as a leader, not the hegemon65.  
 
Outside the Russian Federation, the main targets of the Chinese strategy in the 
region have been Iceland, Greenland, Norway and Finland.  
• Bering Straits - China supported the project of “China-Russia-Canada-
America” Railway Line that would include a 200 km underwater tunnel 
beneath the Straits66.  
• Norway and Finland – Chinese companies declared themselves interested in 
investing in the Norwegian port of Kirkenes’ various  development projects, 
and in the construction of a railway that would unite the Norwegian town of 
Kirkenes with the Finnish town, Rovaniemi67.  
• Iceland – China declared itself ready to develop, in partnership with Iceland, 
a transit port in one of the following locations: Eyjafjörður, Hvalfjörður or 
Reyðarfjörður. The project remains in debate as a result of EU opposition. 
But cooperation between China and Iceland exceeds harbor plans reaching 
into different areas of ecology and green energy production, hydrocarbon 
extraction, fishing, food industry etc68.  
• Greenland – In 2015, Chinese company General Nice took over the Isua iron 
ore exploitation project marking China's entry among mine owners in the 
Arctic. It is expected that this investment will be followed, among other 
possible investments, by the construction of port facilities designed to serve 
the future mine69.  
• Netherlands - In May 2016, the Chinese company COSCO Ports bought 
35% of Euromax terminal in the port of Rotterdam stakes from the Hong 
                                                          
64Sergei Karaganov, Eurasian Way Out of the European Crisis, 07.06.2015, RUSSIA IN 
GLOBAL AFFAIRS, 
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Eurasian-Way-Out-of-the-European-Crisis-17505, 
accessed at 07.07.2016. 
65Marijke Vermeulen, Dusting off the Karaganov doctrine, 17.04.2014, 
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66Ishaan Tharoor, China may build an undersea train to America, Washington Post, 
09.05.2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/05/09/china-may-
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67Chinese Companies to Invest in Norwegian Ports Near Russian Border, Sputnik 
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accessed at 10.10.2016. 
68Arthur Guschin, China, Iceland and the Arctic,  THE DIPLOMAT, 20.05.2015, 
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69Lucy Hornby, Richard Milne, James Wilson, London Chinese group General Nice takes 
over Greenland mine, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, https://www.ft.com/content/22842e82-9979-11e4-a3d7-00144feabdc0, 
accessed at 01.10.2016. 
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Kong registered company, Hutchison Port Holdings70. The Dutch port of 
Rotterdam, the third largest in terms of global goods traffic after Singapore 
and Shanghai, is one of the European strategic ports included, among others, 
in a future liquefied natural gas distribution network.  
• Germany – In October 2016, China expresses interest in buying Aixtron 
semiconductor company and in investing in Port of Hamburg as well71. 
 
3.6 Western Hemisphere - the Panama Canal, the Strait of Magellan 
Chinese strategy in the Western Hemisphere targets both Americas, the two major 
chokepoints of Panama Canal and the Strait of Magellan, as well as the Caribbean 
transport routes. 
   
1. South America   
• Venezuela - in 2011, China Harbor Engineering Company and the 
Venezuelan state company Bolivarian Ports signed an agreement for the 
construction of a container terminal in Venezuela's main port, Puerto 
Cabello72.  
• Ecuador - in 2009, a Chinese company won the international tender for the 
construction and concession for 30 years of the management of deep-sea 
port of Manta73.  
• Brazil – is China’s BRICS partner. In 2010, China started the construction 
of São João da Barra super-port for heavy ships, located near the Brazilian 
capital, Rio de Janeiro74. The port is functional today.  
• Argentina and Chile, geographically linked to Cape Horn, Straits of 
Magellan and Straits of Drake (between Cape Horn, Antarctica and Chile) as 
well as to other smaller straits75.  
                                                          
70Angela Yu, idem.op.cit.  
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drive, accessed at 01.10.2016. 
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Argentina - On 16 November 2015, during the G20 meeting in Turkey, Argentina 
and China signed an agreement for the construction of two nuclear reactors worth of 
$15 billion, and for  two dams in Santa Cruz76 that would have been 85% funded by 
Beijing. In return for this investment, China was to receive a site for a future satellite 
radar station in Neuquen and agreement to transform the Santa Cruz fishing port of 
Caleta Oliva near the Strait of Magellan into an industrial port. The current 
Argentinian administration of President Mauricio Macri elected in 2015 initially 
slowed down these projects, but the bilateral relations seem to have been revived in 
recent months, according to Argentine Ambassador to Beijing, Guelar Diego. 
Moreover, the Argentinean official stated that the volume of Chinese investment in 
his country has reached $25 billion by including infrastructure projects, and is going 
to be extended in agriculture, tourism, mining, telecommunications etc77.  
 
Chile - The bilateral relationship, spurred by the free trade agreement signed in 
2005, included the Valparaiso port facilities that are also en route to the Straits of 
Magellan. The Port of Valparaiso, the largest in the southern hemisphere, twinned 
with the Port of Shanghai and is in the full process of expansion and modernization. 
According to Gonzalo Davagnino, the Port of Valparaiso’s general manager, China 
was invited to participate in these investment projects due to the fact that in 2014, 
30% of the total volume of Chilean imports through the Port of Valparaiso came 
from China78. 
  
2. North America  
Nicaragua - in 2013, Nicaragua's National Assembly approved a concession for 50 
years for management of the future Nicaragua Grand Canal (aka Grand Inter-oceanic 
Canal) to the main financier, Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Investment 
Company (HKND Group), led by Chinese billionaire Wang Jing79. The future 
Nicaragua Grand Canal would connect the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean to 
the Pacific Ocean.  Obviously, if built, the future canal would be an alternative to the 
already operational Panama Canal considered too narrow for Panamax cargo 
                                                                                                                                                      
overseas claimed by Argentina) and Murray Channel of Tierra del Fuego Archipelago, 
between the islands Chilean islands of Hoste and Navarino . 
76Argentina and China reaffirm strategic relation and agree to review contracts, Merco 
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79Christopher Dickey, Will Nicaragua Ever Get Its Grand Canal?, The Daily Beast, 
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vessels80 desite recent modernization and enlargement. For now, the construction 
progress is moving sluggishly due to financial problems, but the contract between 
the Nicaraguan government and the Chinese company remains in force. Also, the 
two sides pledged to build a future port on the Pacific Ocean whose profile (military 
and/or civilian) was not specified. 
• Panama - The sluggishness of HKND’s investment, which is most likely 
backed by the Chinese state, must be connected to the purchase by the 
Chinese company, Landbridge Group, of the nearby Margarita Island Port. 
This port, the largest within the Panama Canal Zone, is located at the 
Atlantic extremity, in the Colón Free Zone81. It is important to note that the 
new Chinese acquisition gives control over a maritime hub which impacts 
both the east-west axis between the Far East and Western Europe, and the 
north-south axis, between the Americas where pass annually over 12,000 
commercial ships. But there are other Chinese investments in the Panama 
Canal, too. On March 1, 1997, the Chinese company Hutchinson Whampoa 
Limited, which is possibly connected to the State Council of Popular 
Republic of China82, leased, for 50 years the management of two other ports, 
respectively Balboa and Cristobal, located at the Atlantic and Pacific 
extremities of the Canal83. 
• Cuba – The Chinese company China Communications Construction 
Company Ltd has managed since the beginning of 2016 a project to 
modernize and expand the Santiago de Cuba Port, the second largest in Cuba 
after the Port of Mariel.  China is also the financier6 of Santiago de Cuba’s 
port located 45 km west of state capital, Havana.  
• Bahamas - in 2000, in Port Freeport, located 60 nautical miles from the US 
state of Florida, the Chinese company Hutchison Whampoa Limited built 
one of the largest container terminals in the world84. 
• Mexico - since 2007, the same Chinese company Hutchison Whampoa, has 
represented a major investor in ports on both the Atlantic Coast in the 
province of Veracruz, and the Pacific Coast in the provinces of Manzanillo, 
Michoacán and two ports in Ensenada. Also, Hutchison Whampoa officials 
have declared interest in the construction of a super-port in Punta Colonet85 
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Bay and in the modernization and expansion of the Lazaro Cardenas deep 
sea port on the Pacific coast. 
China expresses interest in investing in many other ports and economies such as 
Guatemala, Honduras, Belize, San Salvador etc, so the list goes on.   
 
3.7 What are the geostrategic implications of China’s approach? 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century British politician and seafarer Sir Walter 
Raleigh (1552 (4) -1618) stated in one of the speeches that "for whosoever 
commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world 
commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself86". Several 
centuries later, US Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), author of Sea Power 
theory, reiterated Raleigh's imperative saying that who controls maritime 
chokepoints controls shipping insisting on the need to develop naval power as the 
sole guarantor of maritime channel security. Contemporaneous to Mahan, British 
geo-strategist Sir Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947), author of the theory of 
global domination, drew attention to China as a future recipient of Eurasia’s riches 
coupled with the strategic advantage of unhindered Pacific Ocean access. These two 
advantages, wealth and free maritime access, in Mackinder’s opinion, will provide 
China with great source of power able to transform her in the „ruler of the world”. 
Another American geo-strategist, Nicholas John Spykman (1893-1943), author of 
the Rimland Theory, and who was also known as the spiritual father of the 
containment policy, reformulated Raleigh's imperative saying that whoever controls 
the shores, dominates Eurasia and whoever dominates Eurasia, rules the world87. In 
this regard, Spykman said that human civilization is a civilization of water 
developed along coastlines or rivers  where access to the oceans is one of the 
motivations that ignited the territorial expansion of continental states (such as Russia 
for example).    
 
Accepting the above theories makes it obviously that Beijing’s global maritime 
strategy literally applies the principles of maritime domination described by Raleigh, 
Mahan, Mackinder and Spykman, in order to transform China into a global 
hegemon, as the following map, Fig 4, suggests. 
 
The map illustrates China’s maritime chokepoints targets and her level of control 
along global shores. We observe the concentration both in the southern and northern 
hemispheres with the subsequent strategic consequences as described by the 
Rimland Theory and the comments of Raleigh, Thayer and Mahan. Fig.2 map 
illustrates the Chinese Military Plan in Afro-Eurasia. We notice the presence of the 
                                                          
86Sir Walter Raleigh, A Discourse of the Invention of Ships, Anchors, Compass, &c., The 
Works of Sir Walter Ralegh, Kt., vol. 8, p. 325 (1829, reprinted 1965) apud 
http://www.bartleby.com/73/2044.html, accessed at 01.08.2015, (traducere proprie din limba 
engleză). 
87Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1944, p. 43. 
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planed military bases right next to three of the seven global maritime chokepoints: 
the Straits of Malacca, Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. Chinese military plans also 
provide for bases located in the Gulf of Aden, Cape of Good Hope, Mozambique 
Channel, in the numerous maritime straits in the South China Sea, Andaman, 
Seychelles, Malvinas Archipelagos, and extending to West Africa in the Gulf of 
Benin. As we notice in Fig.4, there is a significant Chinese economic presence 
adjacent to other two global chokepoints: the Panama Canal and the Turkish Straits, 
as well as to important strategic straits such as Gibraltar, Magellan, Cape Horn, the 
Mozambique Channel, and the many straits of Indonesian, Philippine, Andaman, 
Malvinas, Greek, and Caribbean Archipelagos. Also noted is the economic 
encirclement of the Danish straits, vital to Russian oil traffic, and the only 
chokepoint not under Chinese military and/or economic control. 
 
The Danish Straits absence from China’s immediate strategic objectives list, as well 
as the failure of taking over Iranian Chabahar Port management or the failure of 
economic taking over attempts of the Black Sea ports, should be regarded as the 
result of a non-confrontational policy against Russia in which Beijing does not want 
to test relations, for the moment. 
 
Figure 4. China’s taking control of maritime straits and global shoreline process 
phases 
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It is useful to remember that the need to secure investments and transport routes was 
the argument used by Beijing officials to explain their extensive military presence in 
Sub Saharan and South Asian countries. Obviously, in the future, China could use 
the same argument to overlay her current economic presence with military forces in 
the many other straits and ports where she has now or is developing and economic 
interest. 
 
If we analyze the situation in the Caribbean we see a concentration of Chinese 
investment in port facilities in the Bahamas and Cuba, which must be combined with 
those in Mexico, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Panama Canal. Given that the US has 
lifted the restriction on the export of hydrocarbons, it is obvious that American 
energy tankers will transit this region. Furthermore, the current Chinese economic 
growth in the Gulf of Mexico should be considered against the massive US 
investment in the same region from oil drilling stations to liquefied gas terminals and 
port facilities. This is underscored by statistics regarding oil traffic chokepoints and 
the level of Chinese involvement in the management of those state’s main oil ports. 
But not only hydrocarbons are transported by sea corridors, many other goods from 
weapons to strategic mineral commodities are also transited through these ports. 
Therefore, it becomes obvious that we are witnessing China’s global takeover of oil 
and commodity maritime traffic control, an aspect that will generate an 
unquestionable economic and strategic superiority. 
 
Also, massive investments made by Chinese companies, mostly in emerging 
countries from Africa, Asia, Central and South America, have become an important 
political and diplomatic instrument for China. This instrument can put pressure on 
governments through its impact on national security whenever bilateral dysfunction 
may occur (i.e. impact on national economy by increasing of the unemployment, 
impact on the GDP volume, on the monetary policy stability). Similarly, if China 
should choose to disrupt traffic through any of the aforementioned straits a global 
economic crisis could quickly result. These elements should not be overlooked given 
that China has already conducted a recent economic war, her two-month long 
withholding of rare earths exports to Japan88 in 2010, or by blocking, in the same 
year 2010, the rare earth exports to the US,89 despite available bilateral commercial 
contracts.    
 
Also, Chinese economic and military presence in the major ports and global 
maritime straits allows an important amount of military and civilian, maritime and 
                                                          
88Keith Bradsher, Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan, The New York Times, 
22.09.2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, 
accessed at 10.10.2016.  
89Gus Lubin, China just banned exports of Rare Earth Minerals to the US, Business Insider, 
19.10.2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-has-just-started-ban-of-rare-earth-
metal-exports-to-the-us-2010-10, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
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terrestrial data collection and analysis opportunities that are and it will be beneficial 
to China’s geopolitical interests. This aspect should take into consideration that the 
collection of intelligence from humans, the so-called HUMINT, remains the most 
valuable source of information and the only alternative when, for whatever reason, 
technological sources fail or are compromised. 
 
And, last but not least, Chinese military interdiction in the South China Sea and the 
translation of the local dispute into a “law fare” action, where international legal 
resolutions are not respected, could threaten commerce and security. Consequently, 
if China were successful in a military takeover of global maritime chokepoints the 
impact on economic, political and global security will be significant.  
 
It is important to note that the Chinese strategy is one of smart-power following a 
sequence of steps: 
• first step is always an application of soft-power starting with an economic 
takeover through the purchase of shares/concession in a enterprise in 
exchange for investment in modernization/expansion of the host country’s 
industrial assets, as well as investments in infrastructure and other economic 
sectors; 
• second step is the strengthening political relations through a policy without 
ethical constraints (i.e. the relationship between China and Omar al Bashir’s 
Sudanese administration. Omar al Bashir has been convicted by the 
International Criminal Court for war crimes in Darfur90); 
• third step advantageous cultural exchanges and education programs for 
young people in Chinese universities that ensures a recruitment pool for 
future agents of influence, 
• final step is the application or threat of hard-power consisting of 
strengthening the bilateral military cooperation and building the Chinese 
military bases. 
 
The aforementioned strategy may be, for example, perfectly identified in Sub-
Saharan Africa where China has already advanced to the final phase, the 
development of naval bases.   
 
Vectors used to implement the strategy, besides the diplomatic apparatus, are 
evidenced by Chinese businessmen residing in the targeted territory as well as 
Chinese companies and consortia who built up the “bamboo network”, or a sort of 
Chinese Commonwealth which can already be observed operating in the South 
China Sea and in Sub-Saharan Africa. From the point of view of shareholders, the 
companies involved in this process are public, private and mixed. But, some private 
companies may have extensive connections with state military and political 
structures in Beijing, and can be considered outposts of the Chinese state in the 
targeted regions. It is important to note that in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, 
                                                          
90Al Bashir Case, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir, accessed at 10.10.2016. 
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Chinese investments were made mostly by ethnic Chinese staff. But, instead of 
going back to China upon project completion, the Chinese staff often permanently 
establish in the regions creating exclusive colonies, and, in some cases sparking 
discontent among locals91. 
 
These data should be corroborated with China's decision to build, by the end of 
2020, a military fleet consisting of 351 ships92. We have to mention that, at present, 
the Chinese military fleet is second in tonnage globally after the US but first one in 
number of combatants. 
 
Also, these data should also be corroborated with some assets that support China’s 
global superpower transformation approach.  China is: 
• the biggest demographic power with an expanding population of over 1.5 
billion people; 
• the world’s second economic power after the US and could overtake the US 
in 2020, according to a International Monetary Fund93 forecast; 
• a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the BRICS 
organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Group of 20 
most developed countries G20; 
• a Confucian society that is hierarchical and disciplined, that actively 
supports the nationalist feelings by Beijing’s official ideology, thus without 
an internaal component of religious strife that has inflamed recent sectarian 
clashes and wars in other countries; 
• rich in important strategic resources ores, especially rare earth metals, which 
will ensure a future abundant supply of raw material for future technologies;   
• has a generally positive political and economic relationship with the Islamic 
world (excepting the Uyghar problem);   
• maintains a “cold peace” relationship with Russia despite geopolitical 
competition. For now, their bilateral cooperation is based on tenuous 
economic and political cooperation that is used by both Moscow and Beijing 
as a bargaining vector in the relationship with the West. 
Certainly, there are aspects that weaken China: 
• more than 800 million citizens living in absolute poverty in rural regions of 
the country; 
                                                          
91Sofie Geerts, Namhla Xinwa, Deon Rossouw, Africans’ Perceptions of  Chinese Business in 
Africa. Survey, Ethics Institute of South Africa, Globethics.net Focus No. 18, 
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accessed at 10.10.2016. 
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• an export-led economy and dependence on investments from and in other 
countries, as well as, export markets which might be a vulnerability within 
the context of China’s seemingly overly-extended investments in farflung 
places;  
• lack of domestic energy supplies, thus dependence on foreign suppliers; 
• technological gap with the West, especially in aerospace and military 
technologies; 
• lack of cultural attractiveness, a significant aspect of soft power; 
• potential outbreaks of unrest and instability in Tibet and the Uyghur region; 
• major economic and social disparity between China's mainland, Rimland 
and islands that can lead to new outbreaks of internal instability; 
• historical issues with Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and in the South China 
Sea riparian states as well as geopolitical competition with India, the US and 
Russian Federation that generates geopolitical balancing mechanisms and 
barriers to the broadening the Chinese influence. 
But, in substance, China’s potential to transform herself into a superpower remains 
high. 
 
Examining at all these data we can conclude that globalization’s greatest beneficiary 
has been China because she has capitalized on this neoliberal economic opening 
with the strategic, political and financial, instruments of a unified state. In this 
situation, in the absence of a counter strategy, it is higly probable that China’s taking 
over of commercial and/or military control of global shores and straits will continue. 
Obviously, the result of this maritime „China-lization” the will be the emergence of 
China as the new naval and maritime superpower.   
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